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NORTH DAKOTA SUPREME COURT REVIEW 
The North Dakota Supreme Court Review summarizes significant 
decisions rendered by the North Dakota Supreme Court.  The purpose of the 
Review is to identify cases of first impression, cases of significantly altered 
earlier interpretations of North Dakota law, and other noteworthy cases.  As 
a special project, Associate Editors assist in researching and writing the 
Review.1  The following topics are included in the Review: 
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1. The North Dakota Law Review would like to thank our Associate Editors, Elizabeth 
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ATTORNEY AND CLIENT – RETAINING FEE – CLIENT’S FUNDS 
OR PROPERTY 
 Disciplinary Bd. of the Supreme Court v. Hoffman (In re Hoffman) 
 
In a per curiam opinion, the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded 
that an attorney violated the North Dakota Rules of Professional Conduct 
when failing to refund fees that had been paid under a non-refundable, 
minimum fee agreement to a client who had terminated services before the 
conclusion of the matter.2 The facts are that Hoffman accepted employment 
in a criminal matter.3  In the contract for legal services, Hoffman agreed to 
“defend the charges to dismissal, sentence or deferred imposition of 
sentence, including a jury trial. . . .”4  The agreement included a non-
refundable minimum fee of $30,000, which was paid and placed in the 
attorney’s operating account.5  Hoffman prepared for and appeared at a 
preliminary hearing; ultimately spending 25.8 hours on the case and turning 
down other clients.6  Only one day after the preliminary hearing, the 
accused terminated Hoffman’s services and requested return of the 
unearned funds.7  Hoffman refused, and the Disciplinary Board petitioned 
for discipline, alleging violations under the North Dakota Rules of 
Professional Conduct.8  A hearing panel heard the case and recommended 
reprimand, return of unearned funds, and payment of the costs of the 
disciplinary hearing.9  Hoffman objected.10 
Upon review, the court determined that Hoffman did not violate North 
Dakota Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.5(a).11  Using a totality of the 
circumstances analysis, it was observed the case involved serious, multiple 
felony charges, was taken over from another attorney, and Hoffman had 
voiced concerns the client was only changing attorneys to obtain a 
continuance of the preliminary hearing.12  Furthermore, the attorney noted 
the client presented a difficult case and he would need to be compensated 
 
2. Disciplinary Bd. of the Supreme Court v. Hoffman, 2013 ND 137, ¶ 28, 834 N.W.2d 636.  
3. Id. ¶ 2. 
4. Id. ¶ 7. 
5. Id. ¶ 2. 
6. Id. ¶ 35. 
7. Id. ¶ 3. 
8. Id. ¶ 4.  The Disciplinary Counsel alleged violation of  N.D. R. PROF. CONDUCT R. 1.5(a), 
Fees; N.D. R. PROF. CONDUCT R. 1.15(a) and (c), Safekeeping Property; and N.D. R. PROF. 
CONDUCT  R. 1.16(e), Declining or Terminating Representation.  Id.  
9. Id. ¶ 8. 
10. Id. ¶ 4. 
11. Id. ¶ 19. 
12. Id. ¶ 18. 
         
2013] NORTH DAKOTA SUPREME COURT REVIEW 523 
for his availability.13  Finally, the court noted that both Hoffman and his 
expert testified the fee was reasonable in North Dakota; the expert even 
acknowledged it was “perhaps a little low.”14  Accordingly, the fee was 
found to be reasonable.15 
The court also determined that Hoffman did not violate North Dakota 
Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.15 by depositing the minimum fee in 
his operating account.16  The court acknowledged the terms of the contract 
specified the $30,000 was intended to be a non-refundable, minimum fee; 
thus, the fee became Hoffman’s property on payment, and the fee would not 
be held in a trust account.17  Therefore, it was proper to deposit the fee in an 
operating account.18 
The court then turned to the issue of the return of disputed funds under 
North Dakota Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.16(e).19  The court 
stated the North Dakota Rules of Professional Conduct are based on the 
Model Rules of Professional Conduct, and thus it may look to other 
authorities who have interpreted a particular rule under the Model Rules.20  
The court acknowledged that while Rule 1.16 jurisprudence requires 
lawyers must return any unearned advance payments when the 
contemplated work was not completed, the decisions have not squarely 
addressed an attorney’s obligations where the fee was labelled “non-
refundable,” and the client, not the attorney, breached the contract for legal 
services.21  Other courts, however, have determined that “regardless of how 
fees are designated by an agreement . . . [an attorney] may still have a duty 
to refund fees which have been considered property of the attorney and not 
held in trust.” 22  Furthermore, other jurisdictions have required the total fee 
be subject to a reasonableness standard.23  The court specifically noted that 
even if the fee is reasonable at the time the agreement was reached, later 
events may cause the fee agreement to become unreasonable at the time of 
enforcement.24  Accordingly, the client may be entitled to a return of some 
 
13. Id.  
14. Id. ¶ 9. 
15. Id. ¶ 19. 
16. Id.  
17. Id. ¶ 15. 
18. Id. 
19. Id. ¶ 20. 
20. Id. ¶ 22.  
21. Id. ¶ 23. 
22. Id. ¶ 24.  
23. Id. ¶ 25. 
24. Id. 
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portion of the non-refundable fee retainer under the circumstances, subject 
to the reasonableness of the fee.25 
The court further underscored that a client may discharge the attorney 
at any time for any reason.26  In the case of termination, the lawyer is not 
entitled to the full amount contracted for, but should only be compensated 
for the legal services actually performed.27  Even though the attorney and 
client have clearly agreed to a non-refundable, minimum fee; upon 
termination, the lawyer is required to return that portion of the fees 
collected, but not yet earned, such that the total fee collected for the legal 
services provided is not unreasonable.28 
The court concluded that Hoffman committed the alleged violation in 
failing to return funds after the termination of services when all of the 
services under the contract had not been performed to completion.29  The 
court ordered return of the funds not yet earned.30  However, the court 
refused to impose discipline proposed by the Disciplinary Board, citing that 
there was no clear prior decision on the issue of whether an attorney may be 
required to return a non-refundable fee when a client terminated the 
lawyer’s services.31  Furthermore, the court cited to the facts that no 
evidence was presented that Hoffman violated the contract,  that the client 
had previously terminated another attorney’s representation, and evidence 
was presented that minimum fee agreements are common in North Dakota 
among the criminal defense bar.32  Finally, the court exercised its discretion 
to alter the assessment of costs and fees against Hoffman.33 Thus, the court 
reduced the assessment of the Disciplinary Board by approximately two-
thirds, representing the fact that Hoffman only committed one of three 
alleged violations.34 
While Hoffman was not accused of failure to safe keep property, the 
court provided guidance on this issue.35  Once the attorney has notice that 
the funds are in dispute, even in a minimum fee agreement, the attorney is 






29. Id. ¶ 28. 
30. Id. ¶ 27. 
31. Id. ¶ 30. 
32. Id. ¶ 31. 
33. Id. ¶ 35. 
34. Id. 
35. Id. ¶ 27.  
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requiring safekeeping of client property until the dispute is resolved.36  The 
court acknowledged this could become an issue in a minimum fee 
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AUTOMOBILES – ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES – DRIVING 
UNDER THE INFLUENCE 
Morrow v. Ziegler 
 
In Morrow v. Ziegler38 Charles Morrow sought review of a district 
court judgment affirming a hearing officer’s decision suspending his license 
to drive for one year.  After his privileges were revoked for refusal to 
submit to an SD-5 test during the course of a DUI investigation, Morrow 
requested an administrative hearing on the suspension of his driving 
privileges, arguing section 39-20-04 requires an officer to include on a 
report and notice that an individual’s body contained alcohol.39  The North 
Dakota Department of Transportation’s (“Department”) hearing officer held 
when the police officer checked the section of the report and notice by 
“[r]efused onsite screening test,” the officer indicated the elements under 
section 39-20-14 were met and Morrow’s one-year suspension was 
proper.40  On appeal, Morrow argued an officer must specifically indicate a 
belief that a driver’s body contained alcohol on the report and notice 
document.41  The Department maintained the officer’s opinion serves as a 
pre-requisite to a request for onsite screening and therefore checking the 
“[r]efused onsite screening test” implies the officer’s opinion as to the 
suspect’s intoxication.42  The North Dakota Supreme Court reversed.43 
Charles Morrow was stopped for speeding by Highway Patrol Officer 
Shawn Skogen.44  During the investigation, Officer Skogen observed 
Morrow had blood shot eyes and smelled of alcohol.45  Morrow admitted to 
consuming one beer with dinner and Officer Skogen conducted a standard 
battery of field sobriety tests to determine Morrow’s level of intoxication.46  
Morrow was read the implied consent advisory and asked to submit to the 
SD-5 screening but refused.47  Thereafter, Officer Skogen concluded he did 
not believe Morrow was sufficiently intoxicated to be arrested for driving 
under the influence and released him.48  On the report and notice however, 
Officer Skogen checked the box indicating Morrow had refused the onsite 
 
38. 2013 ND 28, 826 N.W.2d 912. 
39. Id. ¶ 5. 
40. Id. ¶ 7. 
41. Id.  
42. Id. 
43. Id. ¶ 13. 





         
2013] NORTH DAKOTA SUPREME COURT REVIEW 527 
test and the nature of the traffic violation supporting the stop, but wrote 
“N/A” in the probable cause section.49  This action initiated Morrow’s 
license suspension principally in dispute.50 
For its analysis, the court focused on its decision in Aamodt v. N.D. 
Department of Transportation,51 to determine whether the provision in 
question was basic and mandatory.  In Aamodt, when an officer failed to 
provide adequate probable cause that an individual was in actual physical 
control of a vehicle while under the influence, it was a material requirement 
to the subsequent suspension and predicated the Department’s action.52  
Without probable cause, the court noted, the Department had insufficient 
information to suspend driving privileges.53  A central takeaway is that an 
officer must similarly form an opinion that an individual’s body contains 
alcohol before the implied consent provision will apply.54 
Morrow’s contention was not that the form was insufficient, but that 
Officer Skogen could have recorded his observations or his belief of 
Morrow’s intoxication on the form but failed to do so.55  The current report 
and notice form provided space to mark Officer Skogen’s findings and this 
would have given the Department sufficient information to reasonably infer 
Morrow’s body contained alcohol.56  The Department argued the officer’s 
opinion was essentially a “predicate to requesting an onsite screening test” 
and the opinion of Morrow’s intoxication was implied in fact by virtue of 
the test being requested in the first place.57 
The court disagreed, noting such an inference runs contrary to 
legislative intent and “slants the law too much toward the Department’s 
convenience.”58  The report and notice, when used to suspend an 
individual’s driving privileges, must communicate in some sufficiently 
direct or indirect way that an officer believed the individual’s body 
contained alcohol.59  Even though Officer Skogen did not find sufficient 
probable cause to arrest, he still could have accurately logged his 
observations and the Department would have had legitimate grounds to 
 
49. Id. ¶ 4. 
50. Id. ¶ 8. 
51. 2004 ND 134, ¶ 15, 682 N.W.2d 308. 
52. Id. ¶ 23. 
53. Id. ¶ 9. 
54. Morrow, 2013 ND 28 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-20-14)). 
55. Id. ¶ 7. 
56. Id. 
57. Id. 
58. Id. ¶ 12. 
59. Id. 
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revoke the license.60  The absence of such observational information, 
however, made the report, not the form itself, deficient and did not provide 
the Department with sufficient authority to act.61 
Justices Sandstrom and Maring concurred with Chief Justice 
VandeWalle’s majority opinion.62  Justice Kapsner concurred in the result, 
but filed a separate opinion to which Justice Crothers concurred.63  Justice 
Kapsner’s concurrence found the officer’s form plainly provided no 
authority and, in fact, was not deficient as the majority suggested.64 The 
officer’s response to the probable cause prompt, “N/A,” and submission of 
the form to the Department was clear indication the officer had no opinion 
as to whether Morrow’s body contained alcohol, and thus, the Department 





62. Id. ¶ 14. 
63. Id. ¶¶ 15-20. 
64. Id. 
65. Id. 
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CRIMINAL LAW – CONSPIRACY – HOMICIDE – CRIMINAL 
INTENT 
State v. Borner 
 
In State v. Borner,66 the North Dakota Supreme Court held that the 
charge of conspiracy to commit murder is not a cognizable offense.67  Over 
vigorous dissent, the court recognized that conspiracy is a specific intent 
crime that requires both intent to agree and the intent to achieve a particular 
result that is criminal.68  Thus, conspiracy to commit murder requires a 
finding of intent to cause death and cannot be based on a theory of murder 
under extreme indifference murder.69 
Borner was charged with criminal conspiracy to commit murder under 
both criminal conspiracy and extreme indifference murder statutes.70  At a 
pretrial hearing, the State amended the criminal information to specify the 
culpability requirement for extreme indifference murder includes 
“knowingly” rather than “willfully.”71  At trial, there was debate over the 
definition of conspiracy to commit murder in the jury instructions.72  The 
court included that conspiracy to commit murder requires an agreement to 
cause murder or cause death.73  However, the State argued the agreement 
was to create a circumstance, manifested by an extreme indifference to the 
value of human life, and an agreement to commit murder was not an 
essential element of the charge.74  Borner agreed with the court, arguing an 
agreement to create circumstances manifesting extreme indifference 
constituted conspiracy to commit reckless endangerment.75 
After the State’s case, Borner’s co-conspirator sought a judgment of 
acquittal, arguing a failure to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the 
defendant’s agreed to commit murder.76  The motion was denied, and 
 
66. 2013 ND 141, 863 N.W.2d 383.  
67. Id. ¶ 1.  
68. Id. 
69. Id. ¶ 24. 
70. Id. ¶ 2.  N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 12.1-06-04, 12.1-16-01(1)(b).  Id. 
71. Id.  The amended complaint in Count One stated, “That the Defendants did then and 
there agree with one another to knowingly engage in or cause circumstances manifesting extreme 
difference to the value of life.”  Id. ¶ 3.  
72. Id. ¶ 4. 
73. Id. ¶ 5. 
74. Id. 
75. Id.  The final jury instructions defined conspiracy to commit murder as follows:  “A 
person is guilty of conspiracy to commit murder if the person agreed with another to knowingly 
engage in or cause conduct which, in fact, constitutes the offense of murder of another under 
circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life, and one party to that 
agreement did an overt act to effect an objective of the conspiracy.”  Id.  
76. Id. ¶ 6. 
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Borner was found guilty of two counts of conspiracy to commit murder.77  
Upon conviction, Borner appealed the trial court’s conviction for 
conspiracy to commit murder, arguing the amended criminal information 
failed to charge him with an offense, the jury instructions did not correct the 
information’s defect, and evidence presented was insufficient to support a 
finding that defendants knowingly agreed to willfully cause the death of any 
person.78 
Conspiracy is a specific intent crime.79  The Court observed that 
conspiracy is really composed of two “intents;” the first is the intent to 
agree, and the second is the intent to achieve the criminal result.80  Upon 
review of the North Dakota statute, the Court perceived that the conspiracy 
statute requires proof the accused agreed to engage in or cause conduct, the 
agreed upon conduct constitutes a criminal offense, and a party to the 
agreement has performed an overt act to effectuate on objective of the 
conspiracy.81  The court further noted many jurisdictions also require the 
specific intent that conduct constituting a crime be performed for 
conspiracy to exist.82 
Borner was charged with agreeing to engage in conduct causing 
circumstances manifesting an extreme indifference to the value of human 
life.83  The State argued that by so agreeing, Borner agreed to engage in 
conduct which constitutes the offense of murder.84  The court disagreed, 
citing the requisite intent for conspiracy under the Model Penal Code as 
follows: 
In relation to those elements of substantive crimes that consist of 
proscribed conduct or undesirable results of conduct, the Code 
requires purposeful behavior for guilt, regardless of the state of 
mind required by the definition of the substantive crime.  . . .  If 
[the crime] is defined in terms of a result of conduct, such as 
homicide, his purpose must be to promote or facilitate the 
production of that result.  Thus, it would not be sufficient as it is 
under the attempt provision of the Code, if the actor only believed 
 
77. Id. 
78. Id. ¶¶ 6-7.  
79. Id. ¶ 12. 
80. Id. 
81. Id. ¶ 13. 
82. Id. ¶ 19.  
83. Id. ¶ 14. 
84. Id. 
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the result would be produced but did not consciously plan or desire 
to produce it.85 
 The court further cited another source which states, “there is no such 
thing as a conspiracy to commit a crime which is defined in terms of 
recklessly or negligently causing a result.”86  The court noted extreme 
indifference murder is a general intent crime in which the accused does not 
intend to cause death, rather death is a result of the accused’s willful 
conduct.87  Thus, “when recklessness or negligence suffices for the actor’s 
culpability with respect to a result element of a substantive crime . . . there 
could not be a conspiracy to commit that crime.”88 
Accordingly, the court noted, charging the specific intent crime of 
murder requires the accused had the intent to cause the death of another 
person.89  Charging the defendant with conspiracy to commit extreme 
indifference murder, a general intent crime, is inconsistent with the 
elements of conspiracy.90  The court discerned an individual cannot intend 
to achieve a particular offense that by its definition is unintended; one 
cannot agree in advance to accomplish an unintended result.91 
In North Dakota, conspiracy to commit extreme indifference murder is 
not a cognizable offense.92  To find a defendant guilty of conspiracy to 
commit murder, the State must show an intent to agree, an intent to cause 
death, and an overt act.93  The criminal judgment for conspiracy to commit 
murder was reversed.94 
Chief Justice VandeWalle concurred in the result obtained by the 
majority, but observed the majority’s analysis was hyper technical.95  
Rather, the Chief Justice observed, the conspiracy and murder statutes, 
when read together are ambiguous.  As a result, they are to be construed 
against the government.96 
Justice Sandstrom dissented vigorously, citing failure of Borner to 
object at trial and inability of the Defendant to establish plain error on 
 
85. Id. ¶ 15. (quoting MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 5.03). 
86. Id. ¶ 15 (quoting SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 12.2(c)(2)). 
87. Id. ¶ 18. 
88. Id. (quoting MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 5.03). 
89. Id. ¶ 18. 
90. Id. 
91. Id. 
92. Id. ¶ 20. 
93. Id. 
94. Id. ¶ 27. 
95. Id. ¶ 29. 
96. Id. 
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appeal.97  Additionally, the dissenting opinion rebutted most of the 
contentions held by the majority, citing United States Supreme Court and 
other persuasive authority’s rulings on conspiracy, which require only proof 
of the criminal intent required by the substantive offense itself.98  These 
cases supported the State’s view of the charge, that is, it is the conduct that 
must be intended, as opposed to the result.99  The dissent also noted the 
North Dakota laws are modeled on federal law, and not the Model Penal 
Code, which diverge on this issue.100  Thus, it was incorrect to rely on the 
Model Penal Code in analyzing this issue under North Dakota law.101 
  
 
97. Id. ¶ 31. 
98. Id. ¶ 37. 
99. Id. 
100. Id. ¶ 56. 
101. Id. ¶ 69. 
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CRIMINAL LAW – DOUBLE JEOPARDY – JUVENILE 
PROCEEDINGS 
In re M.H.P. 
 
In re M.H.P.,102 was a case in which the State of North Dakota sought 
reversal of a juvenile court order dismissing the State’s delinquency petition 
against a minor, M.H.P.  In a case of first impression, the North Dakota 
Supreme Court upheld the juvenile court’s findings and dismissal.103  The 
Court based its ruling by applying the double jeopardy clause under the 
Fifth Amendment.104 
In 2012, fifteen-year-old male, M.H.P., was alleged by the State to 
have committed felony gross sexual imposition (“GSI”) against E.B., a 
minor, by touching her vaginal area through her clothes.105  At the initial 
hearing, a juvenile referee determined M.H.P. had indeed engaged in sexual 
contact with E.B., and scheduled a dispositional hearing.106  At the later 
held hearing however, the referee ruled M.H.P.’s treatment or rehabilitation 
as a delinquent child, required for a statutory finding of delinquency, did 
not need to be decided.107  While the referee previously found beyond a 
reasonable doubt that M.H.P. had committed the delinquent act, he clarified 
his new position: “[a]lthough this fact alone [commission of the alleged GSI 
act] would be sufficient to sustain a finding of a need for treatment and 
rehabilitation, there was a substantial amount of evidence to the 
contrary.”108  Thereafter, the State’s petition was dismissed and the juvenile 
court determined M.H.P.’s question as to registration as a sexual offender 
need not be decided.109 
On appeal, the State argued the juvenile court erred in holding 
treatment or rehabilitation of M.H.P. was not needed, the juvenile court 
erred in dismissing the State’s petition and in failing to address whether 
M.H.P.’s registration as a sexual offender.110  M.H.P. maintained the State’s 
appeal was barred by the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment 
because of the juvenile court’s finding of insufficient evidence.111  On a 
matter of first impression, the court sought to resolve the issue of whether a 
 
102. 2013 ND 61, 830 N.W.2d 216. 
103. Id.  
104. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
105. Id. ¶ 2. 
106. Id.  
107. Id. ¶ 3. 
108. Id. ¶ 3. 
109. Id. ¶ 3. 
110. Id. ¶ 6. 
111. Id.  ¶ 5. 
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juvenile dispositional hearings’ finding is appealable or whether it is barred 
by double jeopardy.112  The court referenced and distinguished its decision 
in In re B.F.,113 where the State was precluded from appealing a juvenile 
court’s order of acquittal of a juvenile and rejection of a judicial referee’s 
finding of guilt.114  Applying a similar analysis, the court first examined the 
underlying delinquency posture in M.H.P.’s case.115 
Under section 27-20-02(7), North Dakota defines a delinquent child as 
“a child who has committed a delinquent act and is in need of treatment or 
rehabilitation.”116  To meet the statutory definition, the juvenile must be 
found to have (a) committed a delinquent act and (b) found to be in need of 
treatment or rehabilitation.117  While M.H.P. was found by the juvenile 
court at the initial petition hearing to have committed a delinquent act, the 
determination of treatment or rehabilitation was reserved for a second 
dispositional hearing.118  Evidence presented at the dispositional hearing on 
M.H.P.’s behalf, however, gave rise to the referee’s conclusion that 
treatment or rehabilitation was not needed.119 
Because the State was essentially asking the court to reverse a factual 
finding by the juvenile court and order M.H.P. be deemed delinquent, the 
court concluded this was impermissible.120  To make such a finding would 
place M.H.P. at risk of loss of liberty, the very concern the Double Jeopardy 
Clause seeks to prevent.121  Double jeopardy, the court noted, is meant to 
require that an individual only be subject to the experience of threatened 
liberty once for the same crime.122  And while in the juvenile action, M.H.P. 
is not at risk for per se criminal punishment, the Double Jeopardy Clause 
still applies in equal force to juvenile delinquency proceedings and 
precludes the court from overturning the juvenile court’s findings.123 
In response to the State’s second argument that the judicial referee 
erred by dismissing the petition and not requiring M.H.P. to register as a 
sexual offender, the court recognized that double jeopardy does not bar an 
appellate review of the issue of registration because it does not concern 
 
112. Id.  
113. 2009 ND 53, 764 N.W.2d 170. 
114. In re M.H.P., 2013 ND 61, ¶ 8. 
115. Id. ¶ 8. 
116. N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-02(7). 
117. In re M.H.P., 2013 ND 61, ¶ 9. 
118. Id 
119. Id. ¶ 3. 
120. Id. ¶ 13 
121. Id.  
122. Id. 
123. Id.  
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prosecution or re-prosecution of a criminal offense.124  Nevertheless, the 
dismissal was found valid.125  The State argued the judicial referee only 
dismissed the “proceeding” (the dispositional hearing) and therefore the 
referee could still have made a determination as to whether M.H.P. was 
required to register as a sexual offender.126  Citing subsections (1) and (2) 
of 27-20-29, the State focused on the usage of “petition” and “proceeding” 
in the statute.127  The wording of subsection (1) directs the court to “dismiss 
the petition” in the event the court finds delinquency has not been met.128  
Similarly, subsection (2) directs the court to “dismiss the proceeding” if the 
juvenile is found not to be in need of treatment or rehabilitation.129  On 
these grounds, the State alleged even if the proceeding was dismissed, the 
referee could still have made a determination on the issue as to M.H.P.’s 
registration as a sexual offender.130  The court disagreed, noting the juvenile 
court must find the child is in need of treatment or rehabilitation before 
other procedural dispositions may be pursued and, absent such a finding, 
the case must be dismissed.131  The State’s appeal of the findings was 
dismissed for violating the Double Jeopardy Clause and the juvenile order 
dismissing the State’s petition was affirmed.132 
  
 
124. Id. ¶¶ 16, 17. 





130. Id.  
131. Id. ¶ 19 (citing MODEL JUVENILE COURT ACT (U.L.A.) § 29 cmt.). 
132. Id. ¶ 22. 
         
536 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 89:521 
CRIMINAL LAW – INDICTMENT AND INFORMATION – INFANTS 
State v. Stegall 
 
In State v. Stegall,133 the State appealed a consolidated dismissal of 
three separate criminal complaints of endangerment of a child.  The North 
Dakota Supreme Court upheld the district court dismissals.  The Court held 
the state child endangerment statute did not apply to acts by a mother 
against an unborn child, and the fugitive dismissal rule did not apply to a 
defendant’s pretrial motion to dismiss.134 
Defendants Alexis Stegall, Chelsea Hettich, and Kimberlie Lamon 
(“Defendants”) were all separately charged with endangerment of a child 
under section 19-03.1-22.2 of North Dakota’s Criminal Code after all three 
Defendants gave birth to children testing positive for methamphetamine.135  
After giving birth to her child in December of 2011 and later charged, 
Stegall became a fugitive after missing important motion deadlines and 
court dates.136  Stegall was apprehended in July of 2012 and her second 
court-appointed attorney moved to dismiss, arguing the child endangerment 
statute does not apply to prenatal ingestion of controlled substances.137  
Despite Stegall’s earlier truancy, the trial court reviewed her motion and 
dismissed the State’s complaint, finding no evidence to support post-natal 
allegations of exposure.138 
Hettich was charged in April of 2012 with two counts of endangerment 
of a child after giving birth to twins, whom later tested positive for 
methamphetamine.139  Subsequent tests revealed one child presented with 
methamphetamine and one did not.140  Testimony from investigators heard 
by the trial court, however, indicated neither Hettich nor the new born 
twins, were exposed to methamphetamine after birth.141  Finding the State’s 
allegations insufficient, the trial court granted Hettich’s motion to 
dismiss.142 
Defendant Lamon was charged with one count of endangerment of a 
child in July of 2012 after testing positive for methamphetamine 
 
133. 2013 ND 49, 828 N.W.2d 526. 
134. Id. ¶ 1. 
135. Id. ¶¶ 1, 2. 
136. Id. 
137. Id. ¶¶ 3, 4. 
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immediately following her child’s birth.143  Lamon similarly moved for a 
dismissal, arguing the State’s information and complaint failed to allege 
commission of an act against her child.144  The trial court concluded no 
allegations demonstrating methamphetamine exposure took place after the 
child’s birth and therefore the complaint was insufficient.145  Lamon’s case 
was similarly dismissed.146 
While the court addressed the implications of the fugitive dismissal 
rule in Stegall’s case, finding it within the district court’s discretion to 
extend motion deadlines, the principal issue in all three appeals was 
whether section 19-03.1-22.2 may be used to prosecute all three pregnant 
women for ingesting a controlled substance during pregnancy based on 
detrimental postpartum effects on the children.147  Defendants maintained 
the statute did not apply to unborn children.148  The State argued the 
prenatal ingestion of controlled substances continued to impact the health 
and welfare of the child, and therefore the child is still “exposed” to the 
substance even though no postpartum ingestion exists.149  The North Dakota 
Supreme Court disagreed with the State’s position. 
Citing its decision in State v. Geiser,150 the court focused its analysis 
on the definition of the terms “minor” and “child.”151  Section 14-10-01, as 
interpreted in Geiser, plainly establishes a “child” is a “minor” and is 
acknowledged as such from the first minute of the day the person is born.152  
However, section 19-03.1-22.2 does not apply to an unborn child, nor did 
the court find any legislative intent showing the provision would pertain to 
unborn children.153  Since the Legislature defined unborn child in section 
12.1-17.1, the court noted the Legislature was capable of incorporating the 
definition into other statutes, but did not do so for the purposes of the child 
endangerment law.154  In its opinion, the court recognized rights of unborn 
children to be shielded from third party actors by virtue of statutes 
criminalizing, among several acts, aggravated assault, murder, or assault 
against an unborn child.155  This evidenced the legislative intent to 
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150. 2009 ND 36, 763 N.W.2d 469. 
151. Stegall, 2013 ND 49, ¶ 16. 
152. Id. ¶ 16 (citing Geiser interpretation of N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-10-01). 
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expressly protect unborn children, which is not similarly present under the 
endangerment of a child statute.156 
The State argued the Geiser holding was not applicable since the 
unborn child in Geiser died in utero.157  The court responded by noting the 
decision in Geiser, where a mother was charged for endangerment of a 
child after overdosing on prescription drugs which contributed to the 
demise of her unborn child in utero, was not a determinative fact in that 
case.158  Rather, the Geiser decision is in line with a majority of states 
holding a viable fetus is not a child and pregnant women cannot be 
prosecuted for ingestion of controlled substances during pregnancy.159  For 
the Defendants’ case, the court held section 19-03.1-22.2 does not apply to 
acts committed upon an unborn child irrespective of whether the child is 
born alive or perishes in utero.160  A pregnant woman is not criminally 
liable for endangerment of a child resulting from prenatal conduct, even if 
the child is born harmed.161  Holding otherwise, the court concluded, would 
result in the criminalization of an act that is not criminal at the time of the 
act, if the child dies in utero, but only it affects the child who is born.162 
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CRIMINAL LAW – SEARCHES AND SEIZURES – EVIDENCE 
WRONGLY OBTAINED 
State v. Nickel 
 
In State v. Nickel,163 the North Dakota Supreme Court held that 
removal of a package suspected to contain illicit material from a shipping 
center to the police station and subsequently to the state crime lab was in 
contravention of the Fourth Amendment, and evidence stemming from such 
warrantless seizure should be suppressed.164  Nickel and another co-
defendant owned Big Willies ATP, a smoke shop.  Nickel’s sister delivered 
a package to We Ship, Etc. (“We Ship”), a United Parcel Services outlet, 
for delivery to a company in California.165  The owner asked the sister 
about the package’s contents, and observed that while she appeared nervous 
and evasive, she eventually replied that she was returning merchandise.166  
The owner had previously refused to ship packages for Big Willies over 
concerns for legality of the items shipped, and he felt suspicious about the 
contents of this package, as well.167 
Pursuant to We Ship’s store policy, which allows any suspicious 
package to be opened and inspected, We Ship contacted the local police 
department prior to opening the package.168  Four officers were present at 
the store when the package was opened.169  The officers saw in plain view 
several large plastic bags containing plant material in clear plastic tubes.170  
While the officers were uncertain what the plant material was, they had 
suspicions that the material was synthetic cannabinoid, but were uncertain 
as to its legality.171  Without a warrant, the officers inventoried the contents 
of the package and seized the contents of one tube for testing at the state 
crime lab.172 
The initial crime lab test was negative for any controlled substance, so 
the officers resealed the box at We Ship and it was shipped out.173  Later, 
the crime lab notified the officers that an error may have been made on the 
 
163. 2013 ND 155; 836 N.W.2d 405. 
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specimen, and the plant material may contain a controlled substance.174  
The officer notified We Ship to have the package returned to the store.175  
Upon confirmation from the state crime lab that the plant material did 
contain a controlled substance, the officers retrieved the package from We 
Ship.176 
Law enforcement contacted Defendants about the contents of the 
package.177  Defendants replied they were returning product which was 
initially thought to be legal in the State, but was later found to be illegal, 
seeking a refund of the purchase price.178  Defendants were charged with 
conspiracy to deliver controlled synthetic cannabinoids by agreeing to 
arrange for the shipment of delivery of the substance to another.179  
Defendants sought to suppress evidence obtained in violation of their 
Fourth Amendment rights, arguing the package had been unlawfully 
searched and seized without a warrant.180  The trial court disagreed, finding 
the initial opening of the package a private party search, law enforcement’s 
information obtained during the private party search established probable 
cause, and the plain view exception allowed the warrantless seizure of the 
package contents.  Furthermore, the court ruled the removal of a single 
specimen for analysis was not a search, and the loss of a portion of the 
material was de minimis.181  Finally, the court decided the return of the 
package to We Ship was justified by exigent circumstances, and there was 
no reasonable expectation of privacy in the package after the contents had 
previously been viewed by law enforcement.182  Defendants were found 
guilty in a jury trial.183 
Upon review, the court looked to the Constitution’s Fourth 
Amendment184 and jurisprudence in North Dakota.185  The court found the 
wrapped package, brought to We Ship, was an “effect” under the Fourth 
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184. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated; and no warrants shall 
issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath of affirmation and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.  
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.  
185. Nickel, 2013 ND 155, ¶ 13.  
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Amendment and was therefore entitled to protection against unreasonable 
searches and seizures.186  The Defendants first argued the opening of the 
package by We Ship employees in the presence of law enforcement 
constituted a search by a governmental agent and not a search by a private 
party.187  The court rapidly disposed of this argument, citing the lower 
court’s notice of the fact that We Ship had contacted law enforcement, We 
Ship had made the decision to open the package in conformity with store 
policy, and no evidence was presented that law enforcement had 
encouraged the opening of the package, nor had they exceeded the scope of 
the private party search.188 
The Defendants also argued it was error for the district court to refuse 
to suppress the contents of the shipped package, as law enforcement officers 
violated the Fourth Amendment by conducting a warrantless search and 
seizure after the private party search.189  The court responded by 
analogizing to a similar case,190 also involving the opening of a suspicious 
package at We Ship under store policy.191  Then, the officer transported the 
package to the law enforcement center to conduct a dog sniff.192  When the 
dog alerted, the officer inventoried the package and proceeded to conduct a 
warrantless search of the sender’s garbage at his residence.193  The court in 
that case found the removal of the package from We Ship to the law 
enforcement center was more than a detention, it was seizure.194  The court 
then ruled that all evidence that flowed from the unreasonable seizure must 
be suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree.195 
Here, the trial court found the seizure of the plant material from 
Nickel’s package was supported by probable cause, thus a warrant was not 
required under the plain view exception.  However, the North Dakota 
Supreme Court disagreed, stating “plain view does not justify the 
warrantless seizure of the package for testing of the contents . . . and the 
warrantless seizure of the rest of the contents of the package for transport to 
the . . . law enforcement center.”196  Citing to United States Supreme Court 
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precedent,197 the court noted that not only must the object be in plain view, 
its incriminating character must be immediately apparent.198  In Nickels, the 
officer admitted that he was unable to ascertain whether the plant material 
was an illegal or legal substance.199  Thus, the State did not establish the 
immediate incriminating evidence of the plant material.200  Nor did the 
State establish that exigent circumstances existed at We Ship that would 
justify a warrantless seizure at the time Nickel’s package was re-opened.201  
Finally, the inventory of the package at We Ship in the absence of a 
warrant, was not shown to have been done to protect or safeguard any 
owner’s interest.202 
The court concluded the package was properly opened in a private 
party search, and as a result the officers legitimately viewed the contents of 
the package.203  However, the subsequent seizure of a specimen from the 
package contents and removal of the specimen to the law enforcement 
center and ultimately, the state crime lab, contravened the protections of the 
Fourth Amendment.204  No recognized exception to the warrant requirement 
was found on the record.205  Thus, the district court was found to have erred 
in denying the suppression motions which would have prohibited any 
evidence stemming from the warrantless seizure of Nickel’s package to be 
admitted at trial.206  The court reversed the criminal judgments.207 
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GUARDIAN AND WARD – APPOINTMENT OF GUARDIAN 
In re Guardianship of J.S.L.F. 
 
In re Guardianship of J.S.L.F.,208 considered the granting to temporary 
guardians of permanent guardianship supported, in part, by a minor 
guardianship provision within the Uniform Probate Code (“UPC”).  The 
North Dakota Supreme Court reversed and remanded the district court’s 
grant of guardianship.  The Court held that the “suspended by 
circumstances” provision in the UPC must contemplate some set of 
circumstances that deprives a parent the opportunity to accept parenthood 
rights and responsibilities, the provision is inappropriate in its use to 
evaluate the fitness of a parent, and the record did not support a finding of 
paternal abandonment.209 
Shortly after the birth of J.S.L.F. in 2008, the child’s parents, B.F. and 
S.M.L., came under investigation by Grand Forks County Social 
Services.210  County social workers determined services were required on at 
least two occasions as a result of child neglect and psychological 
maltreatment.211  In October of 2008, the couple and child moved to 
Glenburn, North Dakota and were investigated on at least three additional 
reports of improper supervision of the child, substandard living conditions, 
and malnutrition.212  In March of 2009, the couple separated and the father 
returned to Grand Forks leaving the mother and child alone.213  Between 
March of 2009 and December of 2010, the father saw the child 
approximately six times but maintained timely child support payments.214 
Following the father’s departure, S.M.L. enrolled with Job Corps to 
learn better professional and parenting skills, but the reports to child 
services persisted.215  In November of 2010, the mother left the child in the 
custody of three co-petitioners, G.S., G.J., and K.C., and signed a co-
petition for guardianship consenting to their appointments as guardians.216  
Two days after signing the consent form however, the mother returned to 
G.S. and G.J.’s home with police to take back custody of the child.217  A 
day later, the district court entered an ex parte order granting temporary 
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guardianship of the child to G.S., G.J., and K.C., citing the mother’s 
inability to provide care and finding her parental rights had been 
“suspended by the circumstances.”218  No notice was ever given to the 
father and no hearing was held on the temporary appointment of 
guardianship.219  In late December of 2010, co-petitioners filed a notice of 
petition on both parents for permanent guardianship.220  At the hearing on 
petition for permanent guardianship, the district court ordered both parents’ 
rights were suspended by the circumstances under the relevant portion of 
the UPC and granted permanent guardianship to co-petitioners.221 
B.F. argued on appeal that his parental rights were not suspended by 
the circumstances pursuant to section 30.1-27-04.  In pertinent part, the 
statute provides “[t]he court may appoint a guardian for an unmarried minor 
if all parental rights of custody have been terminated or suspended by 
circumstances or prior court order.”  However, the court may not appoint a 
guardian when a living parent of the minor is entitled to custody.222  Co-
petitioners argued parental rights to a child are suspended by circumstances 
if the parents are found by a court to be unfit and therefore the guardianship 
appointment by the district court was proper.223 
The North Dakota Supreme Court disagreed, noting parental rights may 
be suspended by circumstances when exceptional circumstances are present 
which may then permit a court to utilize the best interests of the child 
test.224  The court explained the phrase “suspended by circumstances” is not 
defined under state statute, but found the definition used by the Idaho 
Supreme Court and other jurisdictions to be persuasive: “[s]uspended by 
circumstances must contemplate some set of circumstances which deprives 
a parent of the ability to accept the rights and responsibilities of 
parenthood.”225  A guardianship proceeding, however, is not an appropriate 
forum to test the fitness of a parent, even if it may be appropriate if a parent 
has formerly been adjudicated as unfit.226  The guardianship provisions 
within the UPC used in the present case to suspend the parental rights of the 
father were not intended by the legislature, in the court’s view, to usurp 
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existing custody jurisprudence since the Uniform Juvenile Act (“UJA”) 
roundly protects the interests of children and parents.227 
The court also found the guardianship lacking in several other areas, 
principally in its failure to adhere to well-settled procedural guidelines 
under the UJA.228  For one, the district court failed to find by clear and 
convincing evidence under section 27-20-29 that deprivation or unfitness 
was present in J.S.L.F.’s case.  Moreover, the district failed to pursue or 
discuss other available procedural options for resolving the facts.229 
The district court’s finding of abandonment by suspension of the 
circumstances was also found by the court to be deficient by not “stating a 
legal standard for abandonment.”230  The court cited its criteria for an 
appropriate finding of abandonment considering factors such as a parent’s 
contact and communication with the child, love, care, affection, and 
parental intent.231  For a petitioner to create guardianship on the basis of 
abandonment, the party must demonstrate the exact circumstances 
justifying abandonment under the UJCA or the Revised Uniform Adoption 
Act (“RUAA”).232  Based on the father’s frequent contact, regular 
visitation, timely child support payments, and recent co-habitation with the 
child and mother, a finding of abandonment was not appropriately 
supported by facts and was clearly erroneous.233  Accordingly, the 
guardianship appointments were reversed and the case was remanded for 
entry of judgment in the father’s favor and grant of paternal custody.234 
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INSURANCE – AUTOMOBILE – STACKING 
Tweten v. Country Preferred Ins. Co. 
 
In response to a certified question by the United States District Court of 
the District of North Dakota, Tweten v. Country Preferred Ins. Co.,235 
answered as a matter of first impression whether limitations on North 
Dakota anti-stacking statutory provisions precluded divorced, surviving 
parents of a minor from recovering under multiple underinsured motorist 
policies.  The North Dakota Supreme Court answered “Yes” to the certified 
question.  The Court held the term “insured” was exclusively applicable to 
the deceased minor and state anti-stacking provisions prevented stacking 
and recovery under multiple, separately-held insurance policies owned by 
the child’s parents.236 
Following their separation and divorce in 2004, Michelle and Tony 
Tweten, maintained separate households and, at the time of their child’s 
death, owned separate underinsured motorist policies.237  Tony Tweten’s 
coverage was under a policy with American National Property and Casualty 
Company (“ANPAC”) for $250,000 and Michelle Tweten was insured with 
COUNTRY insurance for the same amount.238  The Twetens’ son, T.T., 
died in a single motor vehicle accident in 2010 while riding as the 
passenger in a vehicle driven by E.N.239  E.N. owned liability insurance 
with Horace Mann Insurance Company with limits set at $100,000 per 
person, but E.N.’s vehicle was otherwise underinsured.240 
In the wake of the accident, the Twetens collectively settled a claim 
against E.N.’s insurer for the policy limit of $100,000 and notified 
COUNTRY and ANPAC of the settlement amount.241  Both COUNTRY 
and ANPAC were provided notice by the Twetens and an opportunity to 
substitute these amounts to preserve potential future claims against E.N.242  
Both companies refused.243  The Twetens subsequently filed an action in 
federal district court against COUNTRY and ANPAC “to recover 
underinsured motorist benefits and claimed each insurer owed its per person 
limit of $250,000.”244 
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Finding a lack of controlling case law, the United States District Court 
of the District of North Dakota issued a certified question to the North 
Dakota Supreme Court for interpretation on statutory stacking prohibitions 
and its effects on “identical insurance claims of divorced persons, on 
separate policies, for the death of their minor son.”245  The question sought 
resolution on two issues: (1) whether the Twetens were precluded from full 
recovery from both policies based on anti-stacking provisions of section 
26.1-40 of the North Dakota Century Code; and (2) whether the Twetens 
were foreclosed from full recovery from both policies by the phrase “other 
insurance” referenced in both policies.246 
Seeking a “Yes” to the certified question, insurers COUNTRY and 
ANPAC maintained the term “insured” applied exclusively to the injured 
party, T.T.  In opposition and seeking a “No” to the certified question, the 
Twetens maintained the term “insured” did not exclusively apply to T.T., 
and even if it did, each insurer’s policy provided greater coverage for 
underinsured motorists than the minimum required under North Dakota law 
and entitled each parent to additional recovery.247  The North Dakota 
Supreme Court held, “Yes,” any recovery of underinsured motorist benefits 
arising out of a wrongful death claim turned on the decedent’s status as an 
“insured” under the policy, not the surviving claimants.  The court 
disagreed with the Twetens’ principal contention, because neither Michelle 
nor Tony were entitled to recovery of underinsured motorist coverage under 
the other parent’s policy, the stacking did not violate statutory provisions.248  
In response, the court cited its reasoning in Bjornson v. Guaranty Nat. Ins. 
Co.,249 where the daughter of a deceased motorist was entitled to recovery 
via underinsured motorist coverage even though the decedent’s policy 
precluded recovery of uninsured motorist benefits.  In Bjornnson, the 
“insured” was the decedent as the holder of the policy, not the surviving 
daughter seeking recovery.250  The daughter’s recovery for underinsured 
motorist benefits in the wrongful death claim turned on the decedent’s 
status as an “insured” entity under the policy.251  Moreover, she was 
precluded from recovery of uninsured motorist benefits but was entitled to 
underinsured motorist coverage.252 
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For the Twetens’ claim, the court noted the provision in question 
requires an insurer to provide underinsured coverage for motorists “at limits 
to equal the limits of uninsured motorist coverage.”253  Under the statute, 
the underinsured motorist coverage is required to pay compensatory 
damages that the “insured” is entitled to collect.254  The Twetens’ recovery 
of the underinsured benefits was permitted because T.T. qualified as the 
“insured” under the policy.  T.T., and not the Twetens by virtue of holding 
separate policies, represented the “insured” party and T.T., as the “insured,” 
was entitled to underinsured motorist coverage under section 26.1-40-
15.3(1) but precluded under from stacking policies to determine coverage 
amounts under section 26.1-40-15.4(2).255  The court refused to address the 
second issue regarding “other insurance” clauses in the Twetens’ policies 
because their recovery was expressly barred by section 26.1-40-15.4(2).256 
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INSURANCE – CONTRACTS AND POLICIES – RULES OF 
CONSTRUCTION 
K & L Homes, Inc. v. American Family Mutual Ins. Co. 
 
In K & L Homes Inc., v. American Family Mutual Ins. Co.,257 the issue 
was whether an “occurrence” as referenced in a commercial general liability 
(“CGL”) policy could have taken place such that summary judgment by the 
district court was premature.  The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded 
the facts of the case could support finding an “occurrence.”  The Court 
reversed the district court’s order for summary judgment and remanded.258 
The dispute arose out of an underlying adverse judgment K & L 
received in Leno v. K & L Homes Inc.259  Homeowners, the Lenos, 
purchased a brand-new home from K & L and later discovered cracks, 
unevenness, and shifting in the home’s foundation.260  Lenos sought 
recovery for damages on the basis of breach of contract and breach of 
implied warranty claims.261  A jury found in favor of the Lenos for 
$254,629.25 and, on appeal, the court affirmed this award.262  Improper 
footings and substantial shifting resulting from improperly compacted soil 
formed the basis for the Lenos’ claim in the underlying action.263  During 
construction of the home, not commissioned by the Lenos at the time, K & 
L subcontracted with Dakota Ready Mix to perform the home’s foundation 
work.264  At the time of construction, K & L was insured by American 
Family Insurance under a CGL policy; but after the Lenos’s award, 
American Family denied K & L’s claim for damages under the CGL 
policy.265 
At the district court, K & L moved for summary judgment on its claims 
against American Family for declaratory judgment and breach of 
contract.266  American Family cross-motioned for summary judgment.267  
The district court concluded that since K & L’s work product was the entire 
house, the damage caused by the subcontracted work was outside the scope 
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of the CGL policy.268  Summary judgment was found in favor of American 
Family.269 
The CGL policy in the agreement obligated American Family to “pay 
those sums that the insured [K & L] becomes legally obligated to pay as 
damages because of . . . ‘property damage’ to which this insurance applies.” 
270  Property damage was a term defined within the policy and required an 
“occurrence” to take place within the “coverage territory” in order to be 
coverable.271  Under the policy, the term “occurrence” was defined as “an 
accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the 
same general harmful conditions.”272  The CGL policy also contained 
several exclusions to coverage including a “your work” exclusion with a 
“subcontractor exception.”273 
K & L argued the property damage from the subcontractor’s poor 
workmanship constituted an “occurrence” under the policy even though the 
house was considered K & L’s work and was therefore within the scope of 
the policy.274  K & L further submitted the policy as a whole should be 
given its full effect and the “subcontractor exception” and the “your work” 
exclusion should apply.275  American Family argued the decision ACUITY 
v. Burd & Smith Constr.,276 was controlling, but the court disagreed.277 
Similar to a number of other courts, Burd & Smith held a CGL policy, 
standing alone, does not constitute an accidental occurrence unless the 
workmanship caused bodily harm or property damage to something other 
than the insured general contractor’s work product.278  Taking up the issue 
as to whether faulty workmanship constitutes an occurrence for K & L’s 
claim, the court corrected its rationale from Burd & Smith, noting the 
distinction between faulty workmanship where an insured’s work product is 
damaged and faulty workmanship where a third party’s work or property is 
damaged.279  Nothing in the CGL policy defined an occurrence by 
distinguishing insured work product from third party property damages.280  
Accordingly, the Burd & Smith rationale was overruled such that faulty 
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workmanship may rise to an “occurrence in the event “the faulty work was 
‘unexpected’ and not intended by the insured, and the property damage was 
not anticipated or intentional so that neither the cause nor the harm was 
anticipated, intended or expected.”281 
But for the purpose of K & L’s CGL policy, only the occurrences that 
result in “property damage” is covered.282  The court concluded the CGL 
exclusion for damage under the “your work” exclusion would eliminate 
coverage but for the subcontractor exception.283  As a result, an insured 
general contractor’s liability for damage resulting from work by a 
subcontractor is preserved by the “your work” exclusion.284  Justice 
Maring’s majority opinion with a concurrence by Justice Kapsner 
concluded an “occurrence” may be present with the CGL policy and 
remanded for additional fact finding on unexpected or unintended nature of 
the resultant damage and if other exclusions are applicable.285 
Justice Crothers concurred with the majority opinion’s result but 
resisted the majority’s overruling of Burd & Smith since the present case 
concerned defective subcontractor work and Burd & Smith involved insured 
general contractor workmanship.286  He resisted the majority’s broad 
holding that faulty workmanship can be deemed an accidental occurrence 
under a CGL policy and wished to wait to take up a similar contractor party 
issue in advance of overruling Burd & Smith.287  Chief Justice VandeWalle 
separately dissented, noting the majority’s departure from precedent was 
not needed or prudent simply to match popular academic opinion.288  His 
main contention was the court could reasonably source from its past 
decisions to hold property damage resulting from poor craftsmanship 
should constitute an occurrence to the extent property is damaged.289  
Justice Sandstrom dissented, reasoning Dakota Ready Mix was not a 
subcontractor, and thus, the CGL exclusion and exception at issue would 
not be applicable.290  He argued there was potentially no “occurrence” 
under the policy since Dakota Ready Mix was not a subcontractor to an 
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existing contract at the time the foundation work was performed.291  Given 
that K & L had no contractual obligation to the home buyer during the 
construction of the house, Dakota Ready Mix was not acting as a 
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MINES AND MINERALS – ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND 
PROCEDURE – APPEAL AND ERROR 
Gadeco, LLC v. Industrial Com’n of State of North Dakota 
 
In Gadeco, LLC v. Industrial Com’n of State of North Dakota,293 the 
owners of oil and gas leasehold interests in Mountrail County real property, 
Gadeco, LLC (“Gadeco”) were invited by shared owners in the same 
interest, Slawson Exploration Company’s (“Slawson”), to participate in the 
cost of drilling and completing a new well.  In the case’s first review in 
2012, the North Dakota Supreme Court reversed a district court order 
overturning the Industrial Commission’s original assessment of a 200 
percent risk penalty against Gadeco in Gadeco LLC v. Industrial Comm’n294 
for failing to accept Slawson’s invitation to participate in the well and 
remanded to the Industrial Commission (“Commission”) for additional 
explanation.295  The Commission determined Slawson’s invitation to 
participate to Gadeco was made in accordance with regulatory requirements 
and again authorized a 200 percent risk penalty against Gadeco.296  Gadeco 
appealed the Commission’s second order on remand and the court 
affirmed.297 
The parties’ dispute dates back to July 8, 2009, when Slawson sent an 
invitation letter to Gadeco and other working interest owners in the 
Mountrail County spacing unit well called, Coyote 1-32H, to test drill.298  
Gadeco and other leaseholders were invited to elect to participate or risk 
imposition of a risk penalty and given a 30-day response window.299  On 
July 15, 2009, Slawson sent a second letter informing Gadeco the drill 
location and the spud date had changed from August 25, 2009 to September 
27, 2009.300  Gadeco signed the election to participate invitation and 
returned a check totaling $338,421.87 for its share of expenses.301  Slawson 
acknowledged receipt of the check and election notice on August 20, 2009 
but returned the check noting the 30-day election period had expired on 
August 10, 2009.302 
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In November of 2009, Slawson petitioned the Commission for an order 
to pool all interests in the well’s spacing unit and permit recovery of a 200-
percent risk penalty against Gadeco and other non-participators.303  Against 
Gadeco’s objection, the Commission authorized the pooling and the risk 
penalty based on Slawson’s compliance with section 43-02-03-16.3 of the 
North Dakota Administrative Code (“NDAC”) and Gadeco’s failure to 
timely respond to Slawson’s original letter.304  On the Commission’s 
original decision, the district court reversed, holding the changed facts 
required Slawson to provide Gadeco with a new participation invitation.305  
The Court reversed the district court reversal and remanded to the 
Commission for further findings of how the risk penalty was assessed and 
what standard was used in its determination that the changes from the 
original letter were not material or substantial.306 In short, the 
Commission’s failure to make sufficient findings and provide sufficient 
explanation provided the district court and the Court with an inadequate 
order to review.307 
On remand from the original appeal, the Commission ruled as it had 
previously: the 200 percent risk penalty against Gadeco was assessed and 
the invitation to participate was compliant.308  The Commission’s 
explanation of its standard and findings were sufficient for a district court to 
affirm the Commission’s order noting the “findings and conclusions are 
sustained by the law and by substantial and credible evidence.”309  On 
appeal, the North Dakota Supreme Court applied the “substantial evidence 
test” defined as “relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as 
adequate to support a conclusion,” also affording deference to the 
Commission’s findings.310 
Gadeco made several arguments on appeal.  First, the invitation to 
participate did not comport with the requirements under section 43-02-03-
16.3 of the NDAC because the provision requires the well’s location to be 
stated validly within the invitation.311  Second, Gadeco argued the second 
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sufficient to make the invitation non-compliant.312  In response, Slawson 
and the Commission argued the “location” of the horizontal well did not 
pertain to the surface, but to the depth and location of production.313  
Moreover, the two parties maintained the terms in the letter were flexible 
and, as a result, Gadeco was not entitled to more time to respond based on 
the clear 30-day response requirement under section 43-02-03-16.3(1)(b).314 
The principal issue turned on the interpretation of section 43-02-03-
16.3 of the NDAC regarding invitation to participate requirements.315  
Justice Crothers’ majority opinion noted during the course of the current 
and prior appeals, the parties continued dispute over this section of the code 
confined the court’s holding to this singular issue.316  Accordingly, the court 
focused on the requirements under this section of the code.317  Noting the 
pertinent part of the code permitted flexibility in “estimated” costs and 
“approximate” spud date, additional obligatory portions were present: “the 
language relevant to the location of the well states the invitation must 
contain ‘[t]he location of the proposed or existing well and its proposed 
depth and objective zone.’“318  In the order, the Commission held the well 
location to be the “completion location and not the surface location.”319  
The plain language of the code required that a valid invitation need provide 
both the location of the proposed well and the proposed depth and zone.320  
Following the literal meaning, the court found the Commission’s analysis 
ignored the word “and” but concluded it was within the Commission’s 
discretion to discern whether the invitation complied with the statutory 
requirements.321 
The original invitation by Slawson included a description of the surface 
location, vertical depth, and termination point sufficiently giving rise to 
Slawson’s compliance with the invitation to participate requirements.322  
Moreover, the “letter did not substantially alter the requirements for a valid 
invitation for the well” and the changes were marginal. 323  Based on a 
review of the evidence from the Commission’s decision, the court 
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concluded the change in cost and approximate spud date were insubstantial 
and the Commission’s findings that the actual well did not materially 
change from the original proposed well were proper and supported by 
credible evidence.324  The term “must” from section 43-02-03-
16.3(1)(b) governing the response window was mandatory and Gadeco’s 
failure to respond within that window subjected them to an adverse ruling 
and a risk penalty.325  Accordingly, the Commission’s decision was given 
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TORTS – NEGLIGENCE – PREMISES LIABILITY – INNKEEPERS 
Wotzka v. Minndakota Ltd. P’ship 
 
In Wotzka v. MinnDakota,327 the North Dakota Supreme Court 
reiterated the state standard on premises liability includes a reasonableness 
standard, in which a landowner must not only anticipate the potential harm 
of an open and obvious danger to an invitee, but must also act reasonably 
under the circumstances.328  Wotzka sued Minndakota as the result of a slip 
and fall accident in a shower at defendant’s hotel, claiming the hotel 
maintained a dangerous condition on its premises by failing to equip shower 
facilities with non-skid strips, bathmats or handrails.329  The trial court 
granted summary judgment in favor of the hotel and dismissed the case, 
concluding the hotel had no duty to warn or take precautions against the 
open and obvious dangers of a shower, but if a duty did exist, there was no 
evidence of breach of that duty.330  The court agreed summary judgment 
was inappropriate for determining whether a landowner both anticipated the 
harm to landowners and maintained its premises in a reasonably safe 
manner.331 
Plaintiff’s appeal was based in premises law, stating whether the hotel 
maintained its property in a reasonably safe manner is a question of fact 
inappropriate for summary judgment.332  Plaintiff stipulated that a shower 
presents an open and obvious danger, but argued the hotel failed to 
anticipate the harm in the shower and to maintain the premises in a 
reasonably safe manner by installing a handrail, non-skid strips, or 
providing a bathmat.333  The court opened its analysis by observing 
“negligence actions are ordinarily inappropriate for summary judgment 
because they involve issues of fact.”334  An action in negligence is based on 
a showing of duty, breach of duty and resulting injury proximately caused 
by the breach.335  The question of whether a duty exists is generally a 
question of law.336  However, when determining the existence of a duty 
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depends on resolving factual issues, the question must be resolved by the 
trier of fact.337 
The court then defined the contours of premises liability law in North 
Dakota, citing landowners owe a general duty to entrants and must use 
ordinary care to maintain their property in a reasonably safe condition.338  
Hotels, among other establishments, must “be operated with strict regard 
for the health, safety, and comfort of its patrons.”339  However, when a 
dangerous condition exists on the property, which is open and obvious, the 
owner may be relieved of liability.340  This relief from liability exists only 
so long as the owner takes reasonable measures to prevent injury to those 
whose presence can be foreseen.341 
While the issue of whether hotels owe a duty, despite the open and 
obvious dangers of showering, has not been addressed in North Dakota, the 
court acknowledged there is a split among jurisdictions as to whether a 
hotel can be found liable in failing to provide safety equipment and features 
in shower facilities.342  Furthermore, the court stated the open and obvious 
condition does not end the inquiry into duty, noting the owner must 
anticipate the physical harm when such conditions exist.343  When the risk 
of harm exists, the owner may also have a duty to warn the invitee or take 
reasonable steps to protect him from such harm.344 
Relying on Restatement (Second) of Torts345 and state precedent,346 the 
court observed the circumstances surrounding the dangerous condition 
should also be taken into consideration.347 The landowner may be required 
to anticipate the invitee will encounter the dangerous condition.348  If so, the 
landowner must then determine if the invitee could be distracted, fail to 
protect himself, or proceed to encounter the danger because the advantages 
of doing so outweigh the apparent risk.349  In these cases, the obviousness 
of the danger alone does not determine if the landowner has acted 
reasonably under his duty.350  Thus, the court states, even if the shower 
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presents an open and obvious danger, the question for the trier of fact still 
remains: whether the landowner should have anticipated the harm, and, if 
so, the landowner acted reasonably to keep the premises safe under the 
particular circumstances.351 
The court compared the shower to natural accumulations of snow and 
ice, noting many jurisdictions relieve landowners from liability because of 
the open and obvious nature of the danger.352  North Dakota has declined to 
follow those jurisdictions and adheres to the reasonableness standard.353  
The court further noted it agreed with Montana, where a finding of 
negligence based on failure to provide safety enhancements in a hotel 
shower is a question of fact.354  While the court affirmed the trial court’s 
determination that the hotel had no duty to warn of the obvious danger of 
the shower, the court reversed the summary judgment as to whether the 
hotel anticipated the harm and failed to maintain the premises in a 
reasonably safe manner.355 
Justice Crothers, joined by Justice Sandstrom, dissented from the 
majority opinion, advocating instead that North Dakota should join 
jurisdictions which find no duty to provide safety equipment in the face of 
the known dangers from a wet and soapy shower.356  The dissent observed 
the majority of jurisdictions do not impose such liability.357  Rather, most 
require a showing of a dangerous condition, such as a defect in the in the 
floor, beyond what is the open and obvious hazards presented by a wet, 
soapy shower.  Relying on a treatise, the dissent noted, “[a] crucial factor in 
establishing liability for a slip and fall injury is showing that the defendant 
had notice of the hazardous condition.  Without such notice no liability will 
attach.”358  Thus, the court has previously held “the mere fact an injury has 
occurred is not evidence of negligence on the part of anyone; rather, 
negligence must be affirmatively established.”359 
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UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION – CAUSE OF 
UNEMPLOYMENT – LABOR OR TRADE DISPUTES 
Olson v. Job Service 
 
In Olson v. Job Service,360 a majority of the court reversed the 
judgment of the district court affirming Job Service of North Dakota’s (“Job 
Service”) denial of unemployment benefits to locked out claimants and 
remanded for administrative resolution consistent with the court’s 
opinion361  Justice Kapsner authored the majority opinion with Justice 
Maring and Justice Crothers separately concurring362 Chief Justice 
VandeWalle and Justice Sandstrom submitted separate dissents.363 
In the summer of 2011, bargaining unit employees of American Crystal 
Sugar’s (“ACS”) North Dakota facilities, represented by a variety of local 
unions (“Unions”), were involved in contract negotiations with ACS 
leadership.364  The parties were unable to reach an agreement, and in 
August of 2011, ACS locked out the bargaining unit employees and began 
using replacement workers.365  The locked out employees (“Claimants”) 
applied for unemployment compensation with Job Service, but were found 
to be unqualified by virtue of their unemployment stemming from the labor 
dispute.  In its ruling, Job Service relied on the language of section 52-06-
02(4) which precludes recovery of unemployment benefits if “the 
individual’s employment is due to a strike, sympathy strike, or a claimant’s 
work stoppage dispute of any kind which exists because of a labor dispute 
at the factory, establishment, or other premises.”366 
Claimants appealed as a consolidated party and an administrative 
referee affirmed Job Service’s denial of the claims.367  The referee 
concluded the inclusion of the phrase “any kind” under section 52-06-02(4) 
was an attempt by the Legislature to be broad and could reasonably be 
construed to include lockouts even if an individual was willing to work.368  
Claimants sought review of the administrative decision in district court 
where the court affirmed Job Service’s decision, concluding the statute 
unambiguously demonstrated the Claimants were not eligible for 
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unemployment compensation due to the lockout.369  Claimants maintained 
the statute did not apply to locked out employees because the phrasing 
“strike, sympathy strike, or a claimant’s work stoppage dispute of any kind” 
only applied to work stoppages arising from employee conduct, not action 
initiated by an employer.370  The inclusion of the phrase, “any kind,” 
Claimants added, referred merely to other types of employee-initiated work 
stoppages. ACS and Job Service argued the phrasing was intended to be 
broad, plain in meaning, and included lockouts of any kind regardless of the 
party responsible for causing the stoppage.371 
Beginning with an analysis of the principle ejusdem generis, the 
majority cited a similar statutory interpretation analysis from Resolution 
Trust v. Dickinson Econo-Storage372 where the phrase “any tax on any real 
estate is paid by or collected from any occupant or tenant or any other 
person . . . such occupant, tenant, or other person may recover by action the 
amount . . . paid.”373  In Resolution Trust, appellee argued the phrase “any 
other person” broadly opened the door to any individual paying taxes in 
order to qualify for a money judgment against the property owner or liable 
party.  The court rejected such a loose interpretation in that case and instead 
relied on the inclusion of similarly classed terms to derive legislative 
intent.374  In short, “the word ‘other’ would generally be read as ‘other such 
like,’ so that persons or things may be read as ejusdem generis with, and not 
quality superior to or different from, those specifically enumerated.”375 
Using the same logic for Claimant’s appeal, “strike, sympathy strike, or 
claimant’s work stoppage dispute of any kind” was found to pertain 
exclusively to employee work stoppages since strikes, sympathy strikes, 
and claimant work stoppages all arise out of employee-initiated action, 
whereas a lockout stems from employer-initiated action.  The phrasing “of 
any kind” used by the Legislature was part of the other enumerated 
employee actions.376  If expanded to other forms of stoppages, the court 
reasoned, it would follow that employee stoppages, not employer 
stoppages, was the reasonable inference.377  Therefore, the phrase 
“claimant’s work stoppage dispute of any kind” applied only to employee-
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initiated actions and since the lockout was not employee initiated, the plain 
language of the statute would not prevent Claimants from receiving 
benefits.378 
The court then examined the competing arguments on rational statutory 
interpretations by reviewing the relevant legislative history.379  In 1981, the 
legislative assembly changed the statutory language to “claimant’s work 
stoppages” to differentiate employee initiated actions from employer 
initiated ones.380  A review of the legislative history and cases circa 1981 
demonstrated the Legislature amended “work stoppage” to include the word 
“claimant’s” in order to reflect employee ineligibility when the employee, 
not the employer, caused the stoppage.381  In the end, the majority reversed 
the district court’s judgment affirming the Job Service denial of benefits 
and remanded to Job Service for resolution in accordance with the 
majority’s opinion.382 
Justice Crothers agreed with the majority but added the plain meaning 
of the statute and any analysis should be limited to interpreting the statute, 
not debating legislative intent from the 1980s.383  The statute would limit 
recovery of benefits if there was a labor dispute and if a “claimant’s work 
stoppage of any kind” arises.  Since a company lockout is not a “claimant’s 
work stoppage,” the second element in a disqualification of benefits is not 
satisfied and therefore disqualification for benefits was improper.384 
Justice Sandstrom and Chief Justice VandeWalle separately dissented 
with the majority’s decision.  Justice Sandstrom took issue with the 
majority’s failure to consider other reasonable interpretations of the phrase 
“claimant’s work stoppage.”  He submitted the phrase “work stoppage 
dispute” under the statute reasonably includes “strikes and lockouts,” and 
took issue with the majority’s interpretation which concludes “lockouts” do 
not apply because of the legislative inclusion of “a claimant’s[:]”  “[t]hus 
the majority’s interpretation suggests the legislature intended the phrase ‘a 
claimant’s work stoppage dispute’ to mean ‘strikes and lockouts, but not 
lockouts.’  This is not reasonable, and a reasonable construction is 
presumed.”385 
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Chief Justice VandeWalle dissented, and contended the judgment of 
the district court should be affirmed as to the denial of benefits.386  He 
found section 52-06-04(2) and its legislative history were ambiguous such 
that deference be given to Job Service of North Dakota’s interpretation of 
the statute.387  Given the ambiguity, he concluded, any resolution should be 
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